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Increasingly accounts of economic organisations emphasise how
markets and microbusinesses are socially embedded. Some writers
(Granovetter, 1985; Werbner, 1984; Ram, 1994b; Metcalf et al.,
1996) advocate an ‘embedded / network approach’ which looks at
how concrete markets and microbusinesses develop and operate
within identity-sensitive contexts. I shall reject this approach, and
instead suggest how markets and microbusinesses are generally
insensitive to the identities of those who are involved in institutions
such as firms and markets. The type of market selected for empirical
examination is retail market trading. By highlighting the wide range
of social contexts that social actors are involved in when coordinating
economic practices, we obtain a better understanding of ethnicity
and avoid essentialist claims.
Key words: Neutrality, microbusinesses, ethnicity and
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Introduction
Traditionally, political economy and economic sociology suggest
that economic institutions operate ‘identity-blind’, so that any
particular associations between such institutions and particular
identities are contingent, that is, not a necessary consequence of
the institutions themselves but of other influences (Sayer, 1995).
However, such views have been contested by a significant amount
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of literature detailing the ways institutions such as economic
organisations are not at all neutral with respect to identities
(Granovetter, 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Smelser and
Swedberg, 1994; Ram, 1994b; Metcalf et al., 1996). Such claims
reflect a feature of the cultural turn in sociology – its increased
emphasis on the cultural embedding of economic and other
institutions (e.g. Werbner, 1984; 1993; Rafiq, 1992; Basu, 1995;
Aldrich et al., 1986; du Gay, 1997; Hall, 1997).
The literature on ethnic minority business (such as Basu, 1995;
Rafiq, 1992; Metcalf et al., 1996; Werbner, 1993; Lyon and West,
1995), for example, tends to assume that repeated instances of
certain associations indicate that the phenomena have to be related.
So, repeated transactions between buyers and suppliers of similar
ethnicity are assumed to indicate greater trust than transactions
between different ethnic groups.  A more sophisticated variant of
the associational approach recommends historical empirical
research to establish how markets and microbusinesses have been
contingently embedded in the cultural differentiated contexts over
a period of time, and how they continue to be an integral part of the
structuring of economic organisations.  However, I will put forward
an alternative approach of how markets and microbusinesses are
embedded in social contexts. It focuses on economic embedding
in identity-insensitive contexts.
This paper, then, is a study of markets and how market processes
are embedded in social relations (Granovetter, 1985). This
embedding has cultural and political dimensions, involving
interpersonal, private and public spheres, all of which make a
difference to the economic activity (White, 1993; Boyer, 1997;
Walby,1986). Ethnicity can be an important aspect of the embedding
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of economic processes (Werbner, 1984; 1993; Ram, 1994b; Rafiq,
1992; Basu, 1995; Lyon and West, 1995; Metcalf et al., 1996).
However, an important consideration here is the avoidance of
essentialist characterisations of ethnicity in which members of ethnic
minorities are treated stereotypically as having enduring, common
characteristics which determine their behaviour regardless of
external circumstances and internal change and variation
(Waldinger, 1995; Hall, 1997; Woodward, 1997; Sayer, 1997a).
Taking the example of fruit and vegetables market trading as its
empirical focus, I examine the way in which all aspects of the
business are embedded in their respective social milieux. This paper
seeks to penetrate beyond the simple description of phenomenal
world and rhetoric of culturalism. Guided by the analytical
methodology of sectoral analysis, it seeks to reject implicitly the
explanatory values of ideal typical constructions and culturalist and
idealist generalisations.
Theoretical Issues
While the embedded approach (see Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter,
1985; Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Smelser and Swedberg,
1994) is a good way of looking at the history of concrete
associations, it evades counterfactual questions (e.g. do they have
to be? -see Sayer, 1992; 1995). Accounts which claim to be ‘realistic’
are often a bad guide to the real because they conflate the real
with the actual, that is the one among many possible forms of the
real that is possible.
Neutrality of Markets
Accounts of social embedding of markets point both to ‘necessary
impurities’ (e.g. non-market, bureaucratic and informal practices,
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and regulation) which support the market system (see Hodgson,
1988; 1999; Sayer, 1995; White, 1993), and cultural embedding
which is sensitive to reason and identity, though is contingent and
accidental (e.g. du Gay, 1997; Werbner, 1984; Ram, 1994b). For
instance, a market transaction requires both an exchange of
property rights and an agreed price, but it is accidental whether the
parties belong to the same ethnic group or that they have similar
beliefs or ideas. A Pakistani seller will not necessarily question my
reason and intention in buying her products. However, she may
want to know my preferences so that she can sell more in the future.
In this respect social embedding is driven by economic imperatives
and not by cultural and moral considerations (Keat, 1994; Waldinger,
1995; Woodward, 1997).
Markets and businesses have a logic and a momentum of their
own which go beyond the subjective experience of actors. Markets
and businesses depend on actions and to some extent the
understandings of knowledgeable actors (Kirzner, 1982; Langlois,
1986). In this sense they are always culturally embedded (Holton,
1992). But markets and businesses routinise, formalise and govern
actions through specific signals and rules, such as prices, money,
management rules and procedures (Sayer, D., 1991). Even though
these usually have to be interpreted by actors, the way the markets
and businesses operate is in varying degrees independent of their
intentions and understandings and disconnected from norms and
values (Polanyi, 1957; Altvater, 1993; Keat, 1994; O’Neill, 1998).
‘Market forces’ are largely unintended outcomes of myriad individual
decisions to buy and sell or change prices, which shape subsequent
decisions (Hayek, 1978; Roemer, 1988). Once we have acted in a
market the effects of our actions in terms of movements of prices
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and stocks are largely beyond our control. Consequently, markets
exemplify the way in which they have a logic and momentum which
is irreducible to the actions on which they depend.
Nevertheless, markets and businesses are necessarily socially
embedded, and so they can never be ‘pure’ (see Hodgson, 1988).
Markets need non-market forms of organisation such as state
regulation to make them sustainable (Aglietta, 1979;
Christopherson, 1993; Wrigley and Lowe, 1996; Sayer and Walker,
1992; Boyer, 1997). Businesses need some degree of support from
other organisations, particularly in terms of ad hoc action and
interpersonal relations among members, if they are to function
effectively. For instance, in microbusinesses family members are
important to subsidise them (Scase and Goffee, 1987; Adkins, 1995;
Baines and Wheelock, 1998; Ram, 1994a; Song, 1997; Allen and
Truman, 1993). In each case, the second form of organisation
supports rather than undermines the first dominant form. The
‘impurity principle’ exposes some of the limitations of markets and
businesses. It also reminds us that the differentiation of modern
society into separate spheres is never fully achieved (see Holton,
1992; Altvater, 1993; Wheelock and Mariussen, 1997; Wheelock
and Baines, 1998).
To the extent that markets and businesses are uncoupled from the
culturally-differentiated contexts, they can be argued to be identity-
blind. However, it is this contention that has come under fire in
recent years, particularly in relation to markets, microbusinesses
and ethnicity, where writers (such as Metacalf et al., 1996; Basu,
1995; Werbner, 1993; Lyon and West, 1995, Light, 1984; McLeod,
1991; Ram, 1994b) have argued that markets and microbusinesses
are, in fact, far from neutral with respect to identity and ethnicity.
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This is consistent with the tendency of the cultural approach to de-
emphasise economic structures and to focus on the cultural agency
as the dominant source of social inequalities, thereby inverting the
pattern of emphasis in earlier political economic accounts (see Ray
and Sayer, forthcoming, for general discussion).
Discussions in political philosophy have long focused on the alleged
neutrality of markets (Miller, 1982; Offe, 1984), on their tendency
to operate regardless of people’s identities or indeed regardless of
their reasons for acting as they do. Actors’ intentions belong to the
cultural sphere, but, in an important respect, markets operate
independently of actors’ reasons for buying and selling. Whereas,
in many other circumstances (such as family negotiation, political
lobbying and international affairs) actors and organisations have to
justify to others what they want to do, actors and organisations do
not have to do so in markets: markets are ‘reason-blind’ and
judgements can be treated as mere preferences (Keat, 1994). As
Offe (1984:82) notes, an essential feature of the markets is that
they neutralise meaning as a criterion of production and distribution.
Turning from indifference to reasons to indifference to identities,
competitive markets can encourage either behaviour which is neutral
with respect to identity, or behaviour which appears to be highly
sensitive to it.  Though in the latter case it is not identity but the
money or goods associated with it that count (Hirschman, 1982;
Simmel, 1955). In the abstract, the neutrality of markets suggests
that ethnicity should or will not make a difference because the market
mechanism operates through unintended consequences of market
choices, success may have nothing to do with merit or fairness and
much to do with luck.  The logic of the market is that all that matters
is what is offered for sale and its price (Roemer, 1988). The social
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characteristics of actors are irrelevant since in advanced economies
markets operate largely under conditions of ignorance of how
products are produced and sold, and who works and trades for
whom. Most importantly, money is abstract and neutral - one
person’s money is as good as the next’s. Moreover, as Sayer (1995)
notes, under competitive conditions actors have an incentive to be
neutral for fear of losing sales and bargains to others. As Simmel
notes:
Innumerable times [competition] achieves what usually only
love can do: the divination of the innermost wishes of the
other, even before he becomes aware of them. Antagonistic
tension with his competitor sharpens the businessman’s
sensitivity to the tendencies of the public, even to the point
of clairvoyance, in respect to future changes in the public’s
tastes, fashions, interests . . . Modern competition is
described as the fight of all against all, but at the same time
it is the fight for all.                                        (1955: 179)
The extent of market neutrality will be illustrated when considering
the customers-seller and the buyer-suppliers relationships at the
retail and wholesale market places.
In the case of labour markets, competitive pressures encourage
firms to employ whoever will do the job best, regardless of matters
of identity, such as gender or ethnicity.  These pressures penalise
those who forego the best candidates on such grounds, though of
course such incentives may be contingently overridden by racism
and sexism (Ram, 1992; Walby, 1986). At the same time,
competitive pressures compel firms to take advantage of any
differences in identity of groups which have economic implications,
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as when employers needing to cut labour costs employ workers
from a culturally-stigmatised group which can be paid low wages
(Ram et al. forthcoming; Phizacklea, 1990; Jones et al., 1994).
However, note the logic of this kind of selectivity: market and
competitive pressures encourage employers to take them on not
because of their cultural identity but because of their economic
exploitability. The latter may in turn be a consequence of
stigmatisation of their identity (Ram, 1992; Ram, 1994b; Peck,
1996), but from the point of view of market actors and market
incentives, it is the economic consequences that matter. The nature
and the horror of economic exploitation will be revealed when
considering the labour process in the retail market places.
Similarly, in ‘family businesses’ children and spouses are just as
vulnerable to economic exploitation as non-family members
(Phizacklea and Ram, 1996, Song, 1997; Kay, 1990; Baxter, 1988).
Such ‘domestic embedding’ may not soften economic pressures,
but rather disguise the nature and the extent of economic
exploitation (Ram, 1994a; Phizacklea and Ram, 1996; Baxter, 1988).
In addition, consumers of mundane goods are unlikely to know or
care about the workers’ ethnic identity or family connections. Indeed,
consumers are just as likely to mis-recognise workers’ and traders’
identities.  Markets and businesses are embedded in the cultural
sphere - the way in which market actions, class behaviour and
identities develop are always in and through gender, ethnicity, age
and sexuality (du Gay, 1997, Woodward, 1997). However, just
because markets and businesses are always socially-embedded it
does not follow that their behaviour is wholly reducible to these
cultural dimensions (e.g. Werbner, 1984; Raifiq, 1992; see Ram,
1994b; see Ram et al., forthcoming for a critique). On the other
hand, while markets and businesses may be largely identity-blind,
they are embedded in the cultural sphere which  certainly is not.
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Microbusinesses
The industrial organisation approach (see Auerbach, 1988) is a
useful start to understand a number of questions concerning the
operation of the market.  For example, why is all fruit and vegetables
trade not done through shops and supermarkets? Why, in general,
are there many traders in each market place rather than just one
large trader? What influences the size of the sector? The essential
and definitive relations that characterise a society are those of its
economic organisation of production and distribution.  In practice,
however, there are tensions, especially for microbusinesses.  The
self-employeds, for example, depend on the unpaid services of
their families and a utilisation of domestic assets for business
purpose and may employ a few workers (Scase and Goffee, 1987;
Baines and Wheelock, 1998; Song, 1997). Making sense of the
subjective daily experiences of ethnic minority market traders in
the retail trading sector, then, requires taking cognisance of both
the objective economic and political forces that have shaped the
nature of the sector and the individual content in which they operate.
In the case of microbusinesses, it is tempting to think of our object
of study as being characterised by ‘marginality’. Yet this could mean
several different things. First, it could refer to the economic position
of microbusinesses in the retail industrial sector (Scase and Goffee,
1982; Baines and Wheelock, 1998). The economic position is
peripheral to the industrial sector largely shaped and dominated by
large capitalist organisations (Smith and Williams, 1986; Guy, 1994).
In such cases, that market traders continue to exist at all owes
much to contingent conditions which stabilise them, such as
regulations on entry, underpaid and unpaid labour, and the continued
existence of a retail niche market (Ram, 1994b; Phizacklea and
Ram, 1996; Metcalf et al., 1996).
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Secondly, marginality can refer to individuals who have an income
which is low and insecure. Yet, the income may or may not be
marginal since it depends on the competitiveness of their
businesses, the size and stability of the sub-market, and on other
sources of income (e.g. paid work), to which occupants may have
access (Scase and Goffee, 1982).  Thirdly, marginality also refers
to individuals’ position in a wider environment in relation to cultural
and political powers. Several writers (such as Murray, 1990; Jones,
1993; Ram, 1994b) have associated ‘minority’ ethnicity with
marginality.  These three kinds of marginality need not go together.
A marginal economic position  may provide an income which is not
marginal for an individual who is not culturally marginalised.
Ethnicity
Traditional approaches to ethnicity have been ‘essentialist’, that is,
based on the assumption that a particular social category is marked
by unchanging qualities, a common essence shared by all members
of the category (e.g. all Asians are united by common characteristics,
experiences and interests). However, empirical studies uncovered
specific ethnic experiences and interests marking up distinctive
ethnic groups (e.g. Metcalf et al., 1996; Hall, 1997). But, as Bradley
(1996) notes, new forms of essentialism may emerge that imply
that all members of a specific minority ethnic group have similar
experiences and interests. This overlooks other forms of
stratifications. Indeed, society is a patchwork of internally diverse
ethnic groups, and individuals may occupy different positions in
relation to formal and domestic economies that run counter to the
common experiences and interests of a specific ethnic group.
Presumably, the virtue of the concept of hybridity is that it highlights
this. Thus, ethnicities are diverse, mixed and relational (Hall, 1992;
1997; Brah, 1992; Woodward, 1997).  How then is this reflected in
market trading?
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Research Design, Techniques and Stages
In 1992 I worked for a year for 4 retail market traders, doing
participant observation as a pilot study for my research. This enabled
me to get an insider’s view of market trading, and to assess what
would be required for the formal project. The people chosen to
observe and interview were not randomly selected but were selected
for likely theoretical interest; e.g. according to factors such as market
traders’ ethnicity, gender and age, wholesalers’ economic size,
product niche and ethnicity, and the different types of regulators
involved. The ‘sample’ had 41 retail fruit and vegetables market
traders, of whom six were African-Caribbeans, one was West
African, two were Indians, one was Pakistani, and one was East
African Indian. Seven of the traders were women, of whom one
was African-Caribbean, one was West African and one was Indian.
The overwhelming majority were white males.  The study also
observed and interviewed 20 horticultural wholesalers, of whom
two were East African Indians, one was East African Pakistani, and
one was Pakistani. Four of the wholesalers were local managing
directors of two national wholesale companies, and the rest were
large and small regional independent companies. The overwhelming
majority were white small wholesalers.
In order to study the regulation process, I selected interviewees on
the basis of the different types of role they played and according to
differences of context. For instance, three were council
environmental officers, two were council officers from the planning
and architecture department, ten were council officers from the
commercial services department. In total 30 interviews with the
regulators were conducted. Additionally, between 1993-5, I attended
15 commercial services department committee meetings, 12 market
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traders’ local branch meetings, and 5 public meetings on strategic
development of city centre, shopping centre and market places.
The next section examines the experiences of market traders,
wholesalers and regulators in the retail market places. Finally, some
concluding remarks and implications will be made.
Empirical Findings
Labour Process
The type of workers employed by the market traders depended on
the nature of the task, the volume of traders’ retail sales, availability
of types of workers, workers’ commitments to other paid or unpaid
work, and competing demand for time from other social areas. The
workers differed in the type of work they did and in their working
hours, and in their relationship to others (e.g. whether family and
kin).  Full-time regular workers, who worked 4-6 days/week, were
paid £125-175/week. Part-time regular workers either worked
between 11am-3pm for 4-6 days/week or 2-3 days/week and they
were paid half the rate of full-time workers.  Part-time regular
workers were in an ambiguous position because they were caught
in a low income poverty trap. The ambiguous position of part-time
workers gave traders an opportunity to take advantage of them not
only by paying them poorly but also by pressurising them to do
extra time unpaid.  Casual workers were employed on a daily basis
depending on how much sorting out, pitching and serving needed
to be done. They were commonly seen on Saturdays and during
Christmas and were paid £10-15 for a day’s work.  The odd job
men were a very marginalised group of workers. The traders treated
the casual workers and odd job men with little social recognition
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and respect.  This gave traders extra economic power over them,
enabling greater exploitation through reducing their pay and
increasing their work load.
Spouses and children who worked regularly usually received formal
wages from the traders’ account books. However, this did not mean
they received these wages in full, for it was in the interest of traders
to reduce the amount of profit they actually declared. Full-time
regular family workers usually received £150-200/ week for 4-6
days/week work, while part-time, regular family workers got paid
£20-30/ day. The family relationship should not delude us into
thinking that family and kin workers wanted to work alongside
market traders. In common with other workers, working on the stall
was a last resort, and one that gave traders an opportunity to exploit
them even if they were family members. In one case, an Indian
trader’s wife was heavily pregnant and had a miscarriage while
working on an outdoor retail stall in the middle of December. In
another case, a Pakistani trader’s wife worked on an outdoor retail
stall in a middle of a cold spell after coming out of a hospital having
had a key-hole operation to her neck.
The economically marginal nature of the sub-sector meant that
some traders could only compete and survive by selling very cheap,
low quality produce, doing most of the work themselves and using
family members for the rest. (Wheelock and Baines, 1998; Scase
and Goffee, 1982; Song, 1997; Baxter, 1988; Phizacklea and Ram,
1996). The literature on family and minority ethnic businesses (such
as Werbner, 1984; 1993) gives the impression that this kind of
social embedding ‘softens’ economic pressures and self-interest.
However, this is not the case in market trading.  Market and
competitive pressures encouraged employers to take on workers
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not because of their ethnic identity but because of their economic
exploitability (Phizacklea, 1990). The traders used the workers’
position in the secondary labour market and their ambiguous
position in relation to the welfare state to further extract unpaid
labour time. Similarly, spouses were vulnerable to economic
exploitation.
Socialising among the people reflected the development of personal
ties that had evolved over the years of being together at the same
place. So, traders played ‘scratch’ card games, borrowed videos
from each other, gossiped and bantered, gambled, smoked and
drank together, had mock fights, played tricks and stole from other
traders, teased passers-by, and mocked retail market officers.
However, the interviews also reflected the desire to socialise with
other traders and workers in order to relieve the pressure of working
in a dense spatial and social setting doing unexciting and low
productive work.
Customers-Seller
Selling techniques were influenced by the unusual nature of market
trading and the perishability of the produce. The sales pitch and
the front stall display were managed in various ways which reflected
some of the differences between traders in terms of whether they
had indoor or outdoor stalls and their location in the market place.
Techniques were also influenced by whether individuals were new
or established traders, by the nature and size of their business and
by the degree of competition between traders. Nevertheless, at
some time or other, virtually all traders would find themselves with
a surplus of certain lines, often of inferior quality and therefore had
to adapt their sales technique. Traders had to treat customers in a
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civilised way and to sell reasonably fair quality produce to get repeat
trade and build up customer loyalty (Simmel, 1955). For example,
Paul Cool (a white trader) commented that most of his customers
were African-Caribbeans, and they were very selective and would
‘finger’ the produce to check for quality. This annoyed him, but he
said that it was important not to shout at them. Rather he had to
put on a smile and just think of the money which he would take
from them.
Buyer-Suppliers
The nature of the ‘market’ and produce and the size and type of
retail outlet meant that market traders could only realistically have
arm’s length relationships with wholesalers. In such cases, the
shared information was simple and did not require a high level of
trust for economic activity to take place. In other words, what
Hodgson (1988) refers to as ‘non-market exchange’ was minimal
and embedding was very weak, so that transactions were influenced
largely by price.  While the relationship between traders and
wholesalers was at arm’s length, and in these respects like the
economists’ model of markets, it also involved the mutual
understanding and familiarity necessary to speed up the process
of buying and selling. These include the tacit and unarticulated
aspects of information exchange of market processes referred to
by Hayek (1978) and Arrow (1974). For example, Mr. Mackie, a
wholesaler, described how, over the course of being on the
wholesale market, he got to know his customers and the types of
business they had and what they were looking for. Not all market
traders were looking for inferior quality, many wanted good quality
and a bit of consistency, especially so if they had an established
trade and needed to keep their retail customers loyal to them. The
relationship was distant, yet still sociable.
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Embedding takes different guises. It is essential especially at the
beginning a) to establish a relationship and b) to develop the
necessary know-how.  But even when they have become
knowledgeable market actors, they still need to have good
relationships with others as they remained dependent on them.
Nevertheless, this is still a minimal form of embedding - ‘strengthen
of weak ties’ (cp. Granovetter, 1973).  In the case of the minority
ethnic market traders, none of the interviewees suggested they
faced open or blatant racial discrimination from ‘final market’
wholesalers. This was partly because most of the traders had
established businesses, and in the case of new traders they sold
‘exotic’ produce, which was a valuable business for exotic produce
‘final market’ wholesalers. For example, Mr. Patel (an East African
Indian wholesaler) said that whether retailers and market traders
were white or black made no difference. His only concern was to
look after his customers because there were four major exotic
produce ‘final market’ wholesalers keen to take his business. For
him, people were only different in the size and type of outlet they
had, the kind of product they wanted and the price and quality of
product they offered.
Even so-called arm’s length relationships involving repeated spot
exchanges required some level of ‘embedding’ to work. However,
the social skills and maintenance of civility involved were deployed
primarily in order to get market information and preferences
(Simmel, 1955; Keat, 1994).   Embedding of market and non-market
relations, then were weak and minimal and occurred largely for
economic purposes (i.e. to boost sales and reduce costs). Market
transactions prioritised economic considerations, the more so the
more intensely competitive the environment. In such a context, there
was little scope or reason for strong social and cultural embedding
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between the market actors (cp. Werbner, 1984; Ram, 1994b). In
effect, market actors were blind to each other’s ethnicity.
Family Involvement
In the next two sub-sections embedding takes a stronger form and
sometimes for non-economic considerations.  Most of the
‘established traders’ had inherited their business from their parents
or kinsfolk. Some of them had built up their customer base after
many years of trading, either having started off with a new business
or having bought the trading and assignment rights from an
established trader. The established traders enjoyed ‘first-mover’
advantages and ‘innocent’ barriers-to-entry that came with having
an established, goodwill trade and loyal and regular customers.
‘New traders’ had started off with a new business as casuals with
no regular stall but had gained one after waiting for one to become
vacant and had established their business with the customers
through a process of learning by doing.
The established traders’ business was less economically marginal
than the newer ones. While it is much easier to inherit an established
business than to set one up afresh, few traders’ children wanted to
do so. Moreover, most established traders did not want their children
to follow them into the market place and encouraged them to pursue
‘a career’ and to do well at school. For example, Mr. Manjit (an
Indian trader) had three young adult children who expressed little
interest since they had  professional careers.  However, some
children of the established traders were pulled into the business,
thwarting their personal ambitions. When an established trader
was unable to provide for his or her family, it was usually the eldest
son who took the responsibility to manage the family business.
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For example, Ahmed Malley (a Pakistani trader) had to withdraw
from higher education when his father became ill and he had to
manage the stalls.
There was a good economic reason for established traders’ children
to consider market trading as a possible choice of work; it was an
easy way of earning money. However, in practice, most were put
off by its low status and lack of respectability.  The female children
especially were actively discouraged, though actual reasons for
entry depended on what other options were available to them. For
example, having established her business afresh through buying
an established stall, Celia Fraser (an African-Caribbean trader) didn’t
want her children to go into market trading, and though none of
them went to university they did do other things. Her eldest daughter
was a hospital sister. Her other daughter occasionally ‘helped’ Celia
on the stall but was shortly going on a management trainee
programme for Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Older traders approaching retirement began to reduce the numbers
of days and hours they worked. For example, Mr. Lowe and his
wife only worked half days until (1.30pm) preferring to spend the
rest of the day at home looking after their grandchildren. Combining
household as a place of individual life market trading as an
economically marginal retail activity invariably meant that market
trading was especially vulnerable to intra-household interests,
conflicts and inequalities (Baines and Wheelock, 1998; Song, 1997;
Kay, 1990; Baxter, 1988; Ram et al., forthcoming). The family
involvement was significant, and this was a common feature for all
the traders. No ethnic group had a greater access to family
resources over other ethnic groups (cp. Ram, 1994b; Werbner,
1984; Metcalf et al., 1996; Basu, 1995). Indeed, the extent of the
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family involvement depended almost completely on the nature of
the retail business. Many children, of all ethnicities, were resistant
to going into the business, and were eager to acquire higher level
cultural assets (cf. Bourdieu, 1984; 1993; Mulholland, 1997).
Market and Trade Regulations
In spot markets, exchanges are constrained by rules and
regulations. Market rules and regulations govern opening times,
product range, entry into market places, market traders’ trade-lines
and the number and allocation of stalls (Kirk et al., 1972). These
regularise market trading, enabling traders and shoppers to buy
and sell with relative ease. Most retail market places in this study
were owned, and the overall scheme managed, by the City Council
Market Committee.  Occasionally, changes are made in regulations,
and some of these arise because retail market officers and scheme
managers feel they could improve the way market places are
managed. For example, officers argue that licences can be made
more specific in the retailing of fruit and vegetables so that a new
entrant who wanted to sell produce had to choose what type of
produce and the range; i.e. ‘exotic’ produce or traditional and non-
exotic produce, and fruit and salads or vegetables, thus ‘rationalizing’
the market.
Often, actual trade regulations can be shaped by interests of other
council departments. Some have commercial agendas, relating to
financial concerns and property development, including interests
in major retail developments.  At times it is simply having an eye on
neighbouring councils in order not to be outdone.  Sometimes the
inability of the Market Committee and market officers to successfully
represent traders’ interests causes tensions and a feeling of distrust
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between regulators and the regulatees.  For example, in the early
1990s, plans to develop the Bull Ring Shopping Centre in
Birmingham were discussed in a context of the Council Executive
Body, Planning and Architecture and Local Economic Development
Departments, focusing on how best to promote Birmingham as a
financial and industrial city, and to improve its then  twelfth position
in the national league of retail centres. This meant that market
places had to move from their current sites and away from the city
centre. The market committee and market officers took the side of
the council and other departments who were instrumental in
designing and promoting the plan alongside the private property
developers and a consortium of business leaders. This caused a
feeling of mistrust between the Market Committee, officers and
traders, and it marred how they cooperated and negotiated on
matters over rent and plans for improving market places.
At the same time, retail market officers and managers had no option
but to try to secure and protect the long term future of retail market
places since market traders and shoppers did not have any powers
themselves. To be sure, retail market officers and managers are
important for ensuring (or trying to ensure) that certain issues and
policies get discussed and implemented despite the lack of popular
appeal and interests from the constituents and councillors, and in
spite of their marginal position within the bureaucracy. In effect,
the analysis of the negotiable nature of, and variations in, regulations
has to take account of how local regulators are embedded in the
wider regime of a regulatory system (Clark, 1992; Gregson et al.,
1997). In the case of market trading in Birmingham, the market
regulators were in a politically and socially marginal position that
only further undermined the market traders’ capabilities to compete
and survive.
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In terms of the concept of class, the market traders, as a marginal
sub-category of the petty bourgeoisie class, were affected by
external events as a social collectivity. What affected their earnings
had nothing to do with their cultural or social identities. Rather,
they occupied a structurally marginal position in the sub-retail sector,
and this exposed them to intense competitive pressures (Scase
and Goffee, 1982; Baxter, 1988; Song, 1997). Furthermore, as a
marginal sub-category of entrepreneurial class, they welded little
influence in urban politics.
Conclusions
Hodgson (1988), Sayer (1995) and Boyer (1997) have argued that
markets cannot create their own pre-conditions and can even
undercut their own institutional foundations. Some measure of
embeddedness is necessary if the market is to operate, for too
much price flexibility leads to instability. Economic embedding
involves both ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ forces, and it can occur for
non-economic reasons. In some ways, markets are neutral with
respect to ethnicity and other differences while in other ways,
particularly to do with targeting customers, they are highly sensitive
to them.
In concrete cases of markets, other social structures and contingent
conditions give retail sub-markets historical, spatial, economic,
political and cultural specificity (Mackintosh, 1990 White, 1993;
Sayer, 1995). While retail sub-markets are always embedded, they
are not fixed but remain contested and ever-changing. We noted
that microbusinesses operate under contingent conditions that are
controlled, marginal and unequal, yet various conditions can also
be absent and be replaced by others. To be sure, microbusinesses
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take advantage of such conditions and in doing so may reinforce
them, but they are produced elsewhere. Furthermore, the social
structures and conditions embedding the market can also be
economically non-functional (e.g. need to socialise), though not
necessarily dysfunctional.
Embedding of markets and businesses can be both ‘identity-
sensitive’ and ‘identity-neutral’. So ethnicity, for example, may make
a difference in terms of trust but not price. Markets require trust,
and ethnicity can make a difference in deciding who to trust. At the
same time in the case of microbusinesses, products are largely
familiar items bought and sold at arms’ length, under competitive
and regulated conditions, so that trust is not necessarily imputed
to social characteristics of actors but rather to the price mechanism
of the market.
Social embedding of economic structures can occur for non-
economic reasons and as a consequence of economic marginality.
Yet, while some black people, for example, may start up a business
because of racism in the labour market and exploit racialised
resources (Ram, 1994b), this does not mean that ethnicity makes
a significant difference to how as business people they behave.
How and in what ways actors and resources come into sub-markets
do not tell us how they will be actually used since the nature of the
product and type of retail outlet make a difference. As a sub-
category of the entrepreneurial class (Scase and Goffee, 1982),
the self-employed act as a social collectivity. They are especially
vulnerable to the vagaries of the market and the fragility of market
regulation. They are prone to failure because of family problems
and inadequate domestic embedding. Operating with a low capital-
labour ratio, they particularly suffer from ageing and a deterioration
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of personal skills and work motivation. They have a few property
assets that can be transmitted to the next generation, indeed, their
children are more likely to pursue an education than go into market
trading (see Savage et al., 1992).
Some ongoing social relationships are for reasons to do with
material and spatial aspects of business, some are not ‘intense’
but at arms’ length, some relations occur out of chance encounters
rather than deliberate or intentional actions, and some involve mixed
ethnicities.  Furthermore, while noting that in real markets social
relations are a mixture of competition, domination, negotiation,
custom and regulation, and some relations also involve socialising,
most social relations are valued and nurtured insofar as they
continue to be useful for generating cash and economising
resources. Indeed, ongoing social relations can threaten to become
economically dysfunctional if there is no effective scope for a change
of ideas and practices, and competitive pressures to lower costs
and search for new markets.
It is worth noting that one unfortunate consequence of research on
the internal cultural processes, to the neglect of other kinds of
embedding and aspects of business, has been the production of
new forms of cultural essentialism. The concept of ‘hybridity’ is
suggestive of the process of change and variability (Hall, 1997;
Woodward, 1997; Maynard, 1994). Members of minority ethnic
communities are influenced by many processes and situated in
many contexts so that the exact nature of their social actions will
reflect their ambivalent positions in society (see Bradley, 1996). It
is therefore imperative to situate ethnicity within wider social and
economic dynamics.
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One of the effects of the cultural turn is not only a marginalisation
of the economic logic, but also a reduction of it to a cultural logic.
While markets and businesses are always ‘embedded’ in the cultural
sphere, so that they are not just autonomous structures, they are
not reducible to the cultural sphere. It is important to retain the
economic and cultural distinction in order to register how far
economic and cultural problems, and divisions, are caused by
identity-blind mechanisms, and how far they result from distinctions
made by actors in the cultural sphere (Fraser, 1995). It is far from
progressive to ignore culturally generated problems (e.g. sexism
and racism), but so too is the converse tendency of neglecting
economic generated problems, or of reducing the latter to the former
(e.g. Metcalf et al., 1996).
In noting the ways in which markets are identity-blind, markets still
require people to be socialised in a way which enables them to fit
in. For example, people have to learn how to buy and sell, including
selling their own labour power. At the same time, people of many
different identities can meet this requirement. In addition to this
necessary ‘minimal’ embedding, markets are also invariably
contingently embedded in a denser set of relationships. For
example, it is contingent whether market relations are embedded
in Hindi-speaking rather than other language communities (see
Ram et al., forthcoming). Despite this embedding of markets in the
cultural sphere, however, they can still operate partly independently
of the latter and have effects upon it.
Empirical studies of how things are need to go beyond making
concrete associations, to what things are capable of being, that is
whether they could be something else. It is a common and easy
mistake for researchers and writers to fail to pursue qualitative and
counterfactual questions after undertaking empirical research
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surveys involving quantitative analysis and associational thinking.
The latter often lead to mistaken casual inferences which ‘explain’
variations in culturalist terms (e.g. Metcalf et al., 1996).
Acknowledging the potential capability of the social embedding of
structures is vital to any progressive thought; to deny it is to license
the conservative conclusion that what is, must be (see Sayer, 1997b;
1997c); but ‘what is’ must be explained in its own terms.
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